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BY PROFESSOR CARL H. ESBECK
O bergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (June 26, 2015), de-clared that the right to marry is fundamental. The U.S.
Supreme Court thereby struck down the laws in approximately
thirty states that denied a marriage license to all but opposite-
sex couples. The Court mentioned no standard of review, but
convention is that a "fundamental right" gets strict scrutiny.'
This is a Fourteenth Amendment ruling and the Fourteenth
Amendment requires "state action." Accordingly, the direct and
immediate impact of Obergefell is only on governmental actors:
local, state, and federal. The private sector, including religious
organizations, other NGOs, and commercial enterprises, are
not directly and immediately implicated. Thus, for example,
to hold a license to operate issued by the government, to be
awarded a government social-service grant, or to enter into a
government contract does not make one a state actor.3
There is also no requirement that state and local governments
affirmatively implement Obergefell in the private sector. While
a state may choose to implement "marriage equality" in vari-
ous ways, such steps go beyond the requirements of Obergefell.
That said, it must be expected that the Court's rhetoric con-
cerning the harm incurred by same-sex couples when denied
the ability to marry will motivate some state and local officials
to seek to extend marriage equality.4
Obergefell did not extend the rigor of the Equal Protection
Clause to "sexual orientation" as a protected class. That would
have threatened further damage to religious liberty. Obergefell is
about the right to marry by obtaining a license from the state,
not a right to be free of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. However, as previously acknowledged (supra, note
4), the "demean" and "disparage" litany by the Supreme Court
will give a boost to state and local officials eager to take the next
step, as they see it, for sexual equality. So expect a push in more
liberal jurisdictions to challenge all remaining classifications by
authorities based on sexual orientation. Not only did Obergefell
speak of gays and lesbians as a class and wrote empathetically
about them, but in obiter dicta Justice Kennedy twice said that
being gay or lesbian is an immutable characteristic. Id. at 2594,
2596. A class formed around an unchangeable characteristic,
one that historically was a badge of invidious discrimination,
is a typical prerequisite to courts declaring a class of persons as
specially protected as a matter of equal protection. Accordingly,
it can be expected that a few lower court judges-ones liber-
ally inclined-will declare sexual orientation a "suspect class"
under the Equal Protection Clause. True, the Court in Obergefell
was intentional in not taking this step. But, from experience, we
should assume that a few liberal jurists will be unable to restrain
themselves and they will take the step not taken in Obergefell.
Although any such step is still pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus binding only on state actors, there
are adverse consequences for religious organizations. If the
class of gays and lesbians is a "suspect class" under the Equal
Protection Clause, then progressive government officials can
argue there is a "compelling interest" in affirmatively attack-
ing such discrimination in the private sector. Further, when
the discrimination is by a person or organization acting on a
religious belief, then there is a clash of two fundamental rights.
In such a contest, does gay equality or religious liberty prevail?
The answer is not clear, but likely it will be case-by-case as in-
fluenced by what is at stake and the particular equities at hand.
The worldviews and religious values of Americans are diverse
and becoming more so. Given our deepening differences, reflec-
tive citizens are quietly asking if it is no longer prudent to take
for granted domestic tranquility. American politics is polarized
and vitriolic. So is our public discourse. We often do not actually
talk to those with whom we disagree, spend time in the same
room with them, or even personally know any of them.
Americans who hold to the beliefs and practices of historic
Christianity seek to live in peace amidst this widening diver-
sity. These Christians want to exercise their faith free of regula-
tion and censorship, not just within the seclusion of home and
house of worship but also in public settings like the workplace,
the campus, the professions, the charities, and main street's
trades and commerce. Many have only recently come to grips
with the fact that they are a minority in their own country.
Even as others disagree with them, people who take their faith
seriously expect to be treated with respect and dignity. They
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are still surprised when this does not happen. Their self-image
is as a child of God, flawed but by grace forgiven and actively
trying to discern and obey his will. They are assured that God
has a plan for their life, one that will bring good rather than ill
if only they will follow the revealed truths in the Bible. To sub-
mit to God's will is not understood by them as a loss of liberty,
though this is a paradox to others. Submission, rather, is seen
as embarking on a new journey that frees the Christian to live
aligned with the natural order of how things were meant to be.
As an incident to God's plan-not its center-is the proper
use of one's body, not to frustrate or deny pleasures, but to do
what is best for one physically and emotionally, and to enable
sexually fulfilling and stable relationships. Sexuality is a gift,
but it can be abused. We are embodied souls; what is done to
the body can't help but affect the spirit. God loves his children
and does not want any harm to come to them by their making
choices at odds with his created order.
Roughly in parallel to the aspirations
of these Christian claimants, Justice
Anthony Kennedy's opinion in Obergefell
v. Hodges describes gays and lesbians as
also wanting to live in peace amidst
America's cultural diversity. As Justice
Kennedy describes it, they too seek re-
spect and dignity by having their iden-
tity as couples legitimated by the state.
135 S. Ct. at 2593. The liberty elevated
in Obergefell is, we are told, the product
of self- definition, in this instance a union
of two women or two men who are com-
mitted to one another and wanting soci-
ety to publicly ascribe jural meaning to
that union. Kennedy writes that "[a]s the State itself makes
marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches
to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that
gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects... .With
that knowledge must come the recognition that laws excluding
same-sex couples from the marriage right imposes stigma and
injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter." Id. at 2601-
02. In some instances, homosexual identity does go much
deeper than sexual pleasure. At its best, the gay and lesbian
movement has many qualities we associate with the church.
There is a broad acceptance of others, a strong sense of com-
mon cause, and a thirst for justice. They are passionate about
sharing their views and unashamed to be recognized for what
they believe.
In prior cases, Justice Kennedy has characterized religious
liberty in terms strikingly similar to his description of gay
rights. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014), Kennedy joined the Court's opinion but filed a sepa-
rate concurrence. In doing so, he wrote about religious lib-
erty in words identical to those used in Obergefell concerning
the right to marry.
"In our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all
persons have the right to believe ... in a divine creator
and a divine law. For those who choose this course, free
exercise is essential in preserving their own dignity and
in striving for a self-definition shaped by their religious
precepts. Free exercise in this sense implicates more than
just freedom of belief. ... It means, too, the right to ex-
press those beliefs and to establish one's religious (or
nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and
economic life of our larger community.
... '[T]he American community is today,
as it long has been, a rich mosaic of reli-
gious faiths: ... Among the reasons the
United States is so open, so tolerant,
and so free is that no person maybe re-
stricted or demeaned by government
for exercising his or her religion" (Id.
at 2785, 2786; emphasis added, citations
omitted).
As can been seen, both sides of this
religion/gay divide make powerful
rights claims. And, without endorsing
Kennedy's parity of these two rights, it
must be admitted that the claims are in
some respects parallel. The religious individual as a child of
God, and the gay or lesbian individual with same-sex attrac-
tion, want to take his or her self-understanding and live true to
it. This understanding is the totality through which each sees
all reality. And there is a desire to be true to that basic identity
not just in private but in open public settings. In all their inter-
actions with government, both groups desire to avoid rejec-
tion or embarrassment or penalty such that each can live out
his or her sense of self in public peace.
What we have, from the Court's point of view, are two vigorous
assertions to a substantive right that, when honored, necessar-
ily limits and checks government. Are these two fundamental
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rights necessarily in conflict? No. The civil law can protect the
right of same-sex couples to marry while at the same time safe-
guard the right of religious persons and organizations not to
recognize these marriages.
Obergefell is a Fourteenth Amendment case. It operates only
against the government. So same-sex couples, say a majority of
the Justices, have a right to civil marriage. The right is against
only the government. They also enjoy all the incidental privi-
leges and benefits of married couples, from tax breaks, to inheri-
tance and pension rights, to medical decision-making author-
ity as to one's spouse. 135 S. Ct. at 2601. But government does
not occupy the universe of public social space. There is a civil
society, variously called the private sector or the public square
of ideas and NGOs and commerce. This is that big social space
devoid of "state action.' To be sure, affirmative government is
ever whittling away at this social space. But it still remains a big
space. And here is the arena where these two fundamental rights
do not need to be in juridical conflict. Both religious individuals
and gay and lesbian individuals can believe in and practice their
core identity, even as they reject that of the other. They are in
conflict as to beliefs, but not in conflict of laws.
We have to do this right, however. This will entail, if not moral
agreement or even mutual civility, a devotion to the principle
that neither claimant should enlist the power of the state to
get the other to renounce their core beliefs or to act contrary
to them.
In this matter, arguments for equality are merely instrumen-
tal and thus unhelpful. Equality can be powerful rhetoric, but
adds nothing of substance and can evoke emotions that cloud
reason. Equality requires a preferred class to which a claimant
wants to be elevated. The formula is "Like things must be treat-
ed alike, while different things may be treated differently:" The
question remains: Are these two things like one another? Only
if they are "like" one another does fairness require equal treat-
ment. The question of whether two things are alike is ultimate-
ly substantive. Obergefell answered in the affirmative as to same
and opposite-sex marriages. (Wrongly, I believe.) It held that
for same-sex couples to enter into a marriage recognized by
the state is a fundamental right as a matter of Substantive Due
Process. However, with its express placement in the text of
the First Amendment religious freedom is also a fundamental
right. Under the law, therefore, the two are seemingly equiva-
lent. Both are substantive rights, and both enjoy the highest
protection from the government's regulation in the form of
licensing, certifying, accrediting, taxing, funding, and the like.
That is not all. Gay and lesbian groups insist that respectful
treatment by the government is not enough. In certain im-
portant private transactions, such as employment, housing,
commerce, and education, both the religious and gay claim-
ants want not to be judged adversely on account of their core
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understanding, religious, in one instance, homosexual, in
the other. Our society has responded by enacting statutes to
regulate these important venues in the private sector. These
statutes, of course, are known as Civil Rights Acts requiring
nondiscrimination in these transactions in regard to certain
historically oppressed classes. Given our nation's history, ra-
cial and religious minorities immediately come to mind. Also
gender and disability are, as of late, protected classes.
And, now, we arrive at the legislative efforts to add "sexual
orientation" to our nation's venerable civil rights laws. If our
legislators do so, then what is to be done when the protection
of the class of sexual orientation conflicts with the protection
of religion freedom?
The response by Christians thus far, as is well known, is to in-
sist that religious individuals and organizations be exempt from
these new nondiscrimination laws protecting sexual orientation.
This framing of the issue has had the
unfortunate effect of shifting the
debate away from a clash of human
rights that have to be balanced and
toward one of equal treatment or
equality. The rejoinder from the gay
and lesbian community is to char-
acterize the insistence on religious
exemptions as seeking an elevation
above generally applicable law. It is
said that Christians are seeking to
avoid a law all others must obey,
indeed, a "right to discriminate,"
the latter now a synonym for homo-
phobic hate.
Anyone who has endured the first
year of law school learns that the first step to legal clarity is
not getting the right answer but it is asking the right question.
This is an instance where framing the question properly is
important.
When there are two human rights being claimed and they ap-
pear to be colliding, there are two ways of posing the conflict
of laws question. The first is to concede that both are legiti-
mate rights-claims and the task is to balance the two with the
aim that both rights be harmonized where possible so that
both are substantially realized. The second is that, for the com-
mon good, society has promulgated a rule of equality as to cer-
tain oppressed claimants defined by a class to which the other
claimants-the religious-want a special dispensation.
The first framing is more just because it avoids the bias that it is
the religious rights-claimant who is against the common good,
that is, in the second framing it is as if the religious is asking for
a special privilege to be excused from a law that is binding on
everyone else. But the religious are not asking to be elevated
above the common good, and it is anti-religious prejudice to
so presume. The religious claimants are only asking that their
claim to liberty be weighed on the merits over against the lib-
erty claim asserted by gays and lesbians.
Secular scholars are asking: Why is religion special? Why
should religious claims get special protection? Have not we,
as an American polity, outgrown the First Amendment's
special carve-out for religion? What these scholars really
mean is: Religion is not special, indeed it is unprogressive
and thereby harmful. Or, more
precisely, they mean religion is
not special to public intellectu-
als, that small class of Americans
from which these scholars come.
Thus, they advocate that govern-
ment stop giving religion First
Amendment protection, as if
their opinions and beliefs should
be preferred and negate the First
Amendment. They, of course, are
not so blunt as to ask the courts
to ignore the First Amendment.
So they devise clever ways for the
courts to limit and otherwise con-
strue the text away.
But religion is special. It was right to recognize religious free-
dom in the Bill of Rights in 1789-91, and it remains right to
do so in the twenty-first century. Human beings are mean-
ing-seeking creatures. Religion is intrinsic to our nature, not
a choice, not a lifestyle, not a social construct. We ask, in-
deed, we can't help but ask: Where did we come from? Why
are we here? Is there meaning or purpose to life? What hap-
pens after we die? The answers humans give constitute the
definition of what law means when we protect "religion." The
answers given are what people believe is worth sacrificing
for, even dying for. And that's why religion has, and should
retain, the highest protection the civil law can give to life's
ultimate beliefs and practices.
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This is hardly the first time a western society, one significantly
shaped by historic Christianity, has divided over absolutes.
One ofJohn Locke's (1688) insights was that a nation's unity
is not to be found in agreement in creedal specifics. In an open
and free society, and given the inevitable differences in human
opinion, a nation-state organized on unity in a particular bibli-
cal creed is unattainable. Civic unity, rather, is found in the op-
erative rule that when one faction is attacked all are threatened
and all will come to the defense of the faction being menaced
by government. A faction's assurance that when pressured by
government the other factions will rally to its defense is what
in time leads to each faction's sense of juridical and domestic
security, perhaps even a patriotic affection for that nation and
its laws.
Dissenting in Obergefell, Justice Samuel Alito predicted that
the marriage ruling "will be used to vilify Americans who are
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy." 135 S. Ct. at 2642.
Everyone has an interest in that not happening, even the gay
and lesbian community. Christian advocacy groups, or the
better ones, have over time learned the Lockean principle that,
"When all are protected, Christians are protected.' That has
to now be broadened to, "When all fundamental rights are
protected, religious freedom is protected." The same principle
works for gay rights.
In the turmoil after Obergefell, the one optimistic note is the
frequent call by Christians to pluralism as an organizing prin-
ciple. Pluralism does not see American diversity as a problem.
Rather, it sees diversity as inevitable, as a given, as the human
condition. But the necessary project to educate American citi-
zens in a mature pluralism so as to peacefully govern ourselves
is in its infancy.
This will not be easy. Christians, who understandably feel
threatened by what's coming downstream to Obergefell, will
have to come to believe that gays and lesbians will rise in de-
fense of their religious exercise. In turn, when gays and lesbi-
ans are threatened, Christians will have a duty to rally to the
defense of their liberty-not a defense of the moral rightness
of their sexual practices, but that they have a civil right to
engage in their sexual practices even as Christians think their
conduct morally wrong.
This is pluralism; radical pluralism. We are asking Christians
to love their neighbors, even those who seek to harm them.
Indeed, especially those who seek, as a matter of pay-back, to
harm them. This will take a maturity in the Christian commu-
nity that it does not presently have. And that means civic edu-
cation in our churches and para-church organizations. There
is work to be done and, to be honest, resistance to overcome
within the very ranks of the church. But, then, as a radical
teacher once observed: "If we do good only to those who do
good to us, of what credit is that to us? Even sinners do that."
(Luke 6:33).
Carl H. Esbeck is the R.B. Price Professor emeri-
tus and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor
of Law emeritus at the University of Missouri.
ENDNOTES
1 The opinion implicitly puts to one side marriage among three
adults, incestuous marriage, and the minimum age to marry
without parental consent, all current state restrictions on the right
to marry. Presumably these familiar limitations and others will be
tested in the future and will have to pass strict scrutiny.
2 The federal government is not strictly a "state actor," but neverthe-
less is bound by the Court's holding via the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), the Court struck down as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment a congressional act limiting the federal definition of
marriage to opposite-sex couples. Although not ordered in Windsor
to do so, the Obama Administration proceeded to aggressively
alter the definition of "marriage," "spouse," "wife," and "husband"
throughout federal law. Accordingly, Obergefell will have limited
impact on federal law as many alterations have already been made
by the executive branch.
3 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (government licensure);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (government funding).
4 Rather than attribute an invidious motive to those who opposed
same-sex marriage, including religious opposition, the Obergefell
Court, 135 S. Ct. at 2602, focused on the effects of that opposi-
tion-using various action verbs: stigmatize, disrespect, subordinate,
exclude, deprive, disparage, diminish, demean, disable, deny, wound,
injure, harm, humiliate. The Court's rhetoric is an impressive thesau-
rus, managing to avoid only the action verb "discriminate."
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